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WASHINGTON 



WHEN 



COMMANDER- 
IN-CHIEF. 



SOME OF THE 

Secret Troubles of \yASHiNGTON 

WHEN 

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF. 

READ BEFORE THE 

MOUNT Vernon Society of Detroit, 

DEC. 2, 1896. 
BY 

MRS. THOMAS CLAPP PITKIN, 

AUTHOR OF 

The Washington Spurious Letters. 
Published by the Society. 






111 exciiaagQ 
MAR 2 9 1^16 



fHE history of any war is not complete until the 
difficulties, hindrances and embarrassments of 
every kind that beset its leaders are made known, 
and this can never be while they are living. We 
read of a victory and it sounds well, but of a town evac- 
uated, a retreat ordered, we are not always told the reason 
unless it was a purely strategical one; it might not be wise 
to say: ''I could not carry out this plan because 3,000 
of my men had no shoes," or "that enterprise was given 
up because there was no food of any kind for the troops, 
nor money to buy any." 

The fame of many a great General owes much to the 
zeal and energy of his Commissary and Quartermaster. 

Bonaparte had no hesitation in saying, in his strong 
way, "An army crawls upon its belly,'' and Wellington 
affirmed the same in more elegant language. The needs 
of those great commanders, with vast resources behind 
them, were just the same, in fact, as our first General met, 
only he had difficulties they never imagined, and so critical 
was the time, so stupendous the results that hung on all 
his movements, that for years his weakness must be con- 
cealed, sometimes, as he says, even from his oivn officers. 

The secret journals of Congress, not published until 
1818, made known to the world many things that only a 



small circle knew before, and read now, fill us with wonder 
at the condition of afifairs which he had to meet and man- 
age as best he could. 

I thought it might be interesting, in this day of Immense 
wealth, of steam transportation, of lightning telegraphs, 
to renew our acquaintance with some of th^^ evils borne 
by our first great Leader, and which he himself said, not 
only prolonged our war most unnecessarily, but added 
enormously to its expense — and which brought on him 
trials he could only safely confide to the body that com- 
missioned him. 

*The Provincial Congress that met in 1775," says Judge 
Marshall — but here allow me to stop a moment and say, 
the word Congress is to some misleading, supposing the 
body referred to was the same in constitution as the one 
that now assembles in Washington every year. The Pro- 
vincial Congress was, in fact, only a committee of leading 
citizens, sent from thirteen independent, sovereign States, 
to confer together on the startling situation in which they 
found themselves as opposed to the great and powerful 
kingdom of Great Britain, and to devise ways and means 
out of it. They, in fact, had no power to carry out a single 
one of their own resolutions and the separate States were 
bitterly jealous of any infringement on their own rights and 
liberties. "This Provincial Congress," as Judge Marshall 
says, "that met in 1775, had adjourned the same year with 
strong hopes that the difficulties between the colonies and 
the mother country would be adjusted to mutual satis- 
faction;" but when the temper of the King and Parliament 
dissipated these hopes and the immense hostile preparations 
of Great Britain convinced them of their mistake, they 



realized they had wasted valuable time. Unaccustomed 
to war on a great scale, as heretofore each province had 
taken care of its own little wars, they had an idea that 
an army could be created each campaign for the purposes 
of that campaign and that such temporary means were 
all that was necessary. Under these false ideas, the project 
of enlisting a permanent army, or rather "for the war," 
was too long neglected, and in the meanwhile the fire of 
patriotism which had inspired the first rush to arms had 
somewhat dimmed as the trials and privations of a sol- 
dier's life became better known. 

George Washington, who, in the Legislature of Vir- 
ginia, had taken an early and decided stand against the 
tyrannical aggressions of Great Britain, received his com- 
mission as Commander-in-Chief from Congress June 19, 
1775, with less enthusiasm than we should expect, but 
with a determination (as he wrote to his brother Augustine) 
''to devote himself and his best endeavors, but fearing his 
own want of experience to conduct a business so extensive 
in its nature and so arduous in its execution." 

With the promptness of a conscientious man, he first 
made his will, which he sent to his wife, "his dear Patsey," 
hoping its provisions would please her, and begging his 
brother and sister-in-lav/ to visit Mt. Vernon as often as 
possible to comfort her, he left Philadelphia for head- 
quarters at Cambridge, where the Provincial Army was 
gathered to oppose the British, whose forces, partly on the 
main land and partly in Boston, were supported by 
numerous ships of war in the bay. 

He arrived July 3d. What did he find there? From 
the reports of officers, he expected to find 18,000 or 20,000 



men, but there were only 14,500 fit for duty. These came 
from dififerent States, without order or discipHne, and 
owing allegiance only to their own State, could not form 
an effective army without complete reorganization, which 
he immediately set himself to effect; but this work required 
time and, unfortunately, the terms of most of these troops 
would expire in November and December, so that a 
council of war, called July 9th, decided that more men 
must be immediately fonvarded to the seat of war to be 
properly drilled to take the place of the disbanded regi- 
ments. 

This was the first want; next the General tells Con stress, 
there are neither tents, nor clothes, nor arms, nor ammuni- 
tion, no Commissar}^, no Quartermaster, no commission of 
artillery, no military chest, which is an elegant way of 
saying no money to buy anything; further, the engineers 
on the ground knew nothing of military needs and he 
begs Congress, if there are any engineers anywhere in 
the country who know anything that can help him, to send 
them on at once; the last, and certainly not the least of 
these needs, was one whose importance we can fully 
understand, there was no pozvder. In the first reports it 
was told him there were 303 barrels, but a few days after 
revealed the astounding fact that there had been a blunder, 
and that, in fact, there were only nine rounds to each man. 

Instantly secret application was made in every quarter 
where powder might possibly be obtained, but not until a 
fortnight passed was even a very small quantity received 
from Elizabeth, New Jersey, and if the citizens of that 
place had known that their means of defense was being 
sent to Cambridge, they would have risen *'en masse-' to 



prevent it, but night and darkness kept the secret from 
them. No powder had ever been made in this country; 
indeed, everything Hke munitions of war, guns, artillery, 
uniforms, blankets, even, had been sent from England — 
that government had not only discouraged all efforts made 
by patriotic men to supply their own needs in manufac- 
tured articles, but by official orders had closed twenty-five 
years earlier factories and foundries that were in successful 
operation/'' 

In this campaign, as late as August 4th, we find the 
Commander-in-Chief writing thus to Gov. Cooke, of Rhode 
Island: 

"I am now, sir, in strict confidence, to acquaint you 
that our necessities in the articles of powder and lead are 
so great as to require an immediate supply. I must 
earnestly entreat that you will fall upon some measure to 
forward every pound of each in your colony that can pos- 
sibly be spared. It is not within the propriety or safety 
of such a correspondence to say what I might on this 
subject." 

Of course it must be kept a secret, a secret that could 
not be confided to the 14,000 men most affected by it, and 
if any rumor of the fact reached the British general's ears, 
intrenched in the good town of Boston, he no doubt 



* It gives me pleasure to say here that men of my husband's 
name and family, taking one of these foundries that had been idle 
for a quarter of a century, turned it into a powder mill and, to the 
extent of their ability, supplied the patriotic army with this neces- 
sary implement of war, until the end of the contest: for this they 
received no remuneration, the only help the government gave 
being the power to seize salt petre wherever it could be found. 



thought it was meant to deceive him, as it was past all 
belief, that an army without bayonets would dare to defy 
him without powder also. No wonder that Washington 
was obliged to confine his operations to simply holding 
the enemy in check, cutting off all their supplies, or that 
he wrote to Richard Henry Lee, August loth: "Between 
you and me, I think we are in an exceedingly dangerous 
situation." 

September 21 he informs Congress: ''It gives me great 
pain to be obliged to solicit the attention of the honorable 
Congress to the state of the army, which might imply the 
slightest apprehension of being neglected. But my situa- 
tion is inexpressibly distressing — to see winter fast ap- 
proaching upon a naked army, the term of their service 
within a few weeks of expiring, and no provision yet made 
for such important events. Added to this, the military 
chest is totally exhausted; the paymaster has not a single 
dollar in hand; the Commissary General assures me he has 
strained his credit for the subsistence of the army to the 
utmost; the Quartermaster General is precisely in the same 
situation and the greater part of the troops are in a con- 
dition not far from mutinyJ' 

That this most insubordinate temper existed in other 
of the military departments is evident from a letter of 
Major General Schuyler to Washington. Schuyler had 
been without powder — but all that Washington could reply 
to his application was an assurance that *'on that point 
their distress was mutual." 

Afterwards, writing from Ticonderoga from a sick-bed, 
Schuyler says: "The anxiety I have felt since my arrival 
here lest the army should stai-ve, occasioned by a scandal- 



ous want of subordination and inattention to my orders 
in some of the of^cers, the vast variety of vexations and 
disagreeable incidents that ahnost every hour arise in some 
department or other, not only retard my cure but have 
put me considerably back for some time past. If Job had 
been a general in my situation, his memory had not been 
so famous for patience, but," he adds, "the glorious end 
we have in view and which I have a confident hope will 
be attained, will atone for all." 

General Montgomery, who was investing the British 
fort at St. Johns, wrote the same October to the General: 
''When I mentioned my intentions, I did not consider 
that I was at the head of troops who carry tlie spirit of 
freedom into the field and think for themselves. I cannot 
help observing to how little purpose I am here. Were 
I not afraid the example would be too generally followed 
and that the public service might suffer, I would not stay 
an hour at the head of troops whose operations I cannot 
direct. I must say, I have no hope of success unless from 
the garrison;" the garrison of the fort he was besieging— 
"needing provisions." 

Later in the same season, both officers, finding them- 
selves so hampered by the confusion and want of discipline 
of their unruly troops, who would acknowledge no 
authority beyond the State they came from, and greatly 
criticised for their inefficiency, had signified to Congress 
their intention to resign, but Washington wrote a most earn- 
est appeal to Schuyler, telling him that he had the same 
troubles, but was bearing them as best he could and beg- 
ging them to do the same and not desert their country in 
the hour of her utmost need. This appeal to both was 



successful. Montgomery left the memory of a patriot 
when he fell, gallantly fighting for his country at Quebec 
— while Schuyler's career is known to you all. 

To return to Washington before Boston, December 5th, 
he writes to Gov. Cook that it will be impossible to recruit 
the army by voluntary enlistments, the fact is so, he will 
not attempt to point out the causes; the Connc^cticut troops 
are about to desert the noble cause they are engaged in, 
and when their time -is up, he fears the Rhode Island, New 
Hampshire and Massachusetts men will do the same. In 
the same month, December, 1775, he writes to his one 
confidential friend, Joseph Read: "Our enlistment goes on 
slowly; only 5,917 are engaged for the ensuing campaign, 
and yet we are told we shall get the number wanted, as 
they are only playing off to see what advantages are to be 
made, and whether a bounty cannot be extorted from the 
public at large or from individuals in case of a draft." 

January 4th, 1776, Washington again wrote to Read: "It 
is easier to imagine than to describe the situation of my 
mind for some time past and my feelings under our present 
circumstances. Search the volumes of history through, 
and I much question whether a case similar to ours is to 
be found, namely, to maintain a post against the power 
of the British Army for six months together, •ivithoiit 
powder, and then to have one army disbanded and another 
to be raised within the same distance of a re-inforced 
enemy. It is too much to attempt. I wish this month 
were well over our lieads. The same desire of retiring 
into a chimney corner seized the troops of Rhode Island, 
New Hampshire, and Massachusetts as soon as their time 



expired, as had wrought upon those of Connecticut, not- 
withstanding many of them made an offer to me to remain 
till the lines could be sufficiently strengthened. We are 
now left with a good deal less than half-raised regiments 
and about 5,000 militia, who only stand engaged to the 
middle of this month, when, according to custom, they 
will depart, be the necessity never so urgent.-' 

In another letter to Read, the General pours out his soul 
thus: "Such a dearth of public spirit and such want of 
virtue, such stock-jobbing and fertility in all low arts to 
obtain advantages of one kind or another in this great 
change of military arrangements, I never saw^ before, and 
pray God's mercy I may never be witness to again. After 
the last of the month the minute men and militia must be 
called on for the defence of the lines, and these being under 
no kind of control themselves, will destroy the little 
subordination I have been laboring to establish, and run 
me into one evil while I am endeavoring to avoid another. 
"Could I have foreseen,*' exclaimed the overtaxed Com- 
mander, "could I have foreseen what I have experienced 
and am likely to experience, no consideration upon earth 
should have induced me to accept this command. A 
regiment or any subordinate department would have been 
accompanied with ten times the satisfaction and perhaps 
the honor." Seeing no way out of these difficulties, he 
ejaculates, "God in his great mercy will direct.'^ 

The minute men here referred to vv^ere bodies of men 
organized to serve under their own officers — who brought 
their own arms and provisions, who came when called on, 
but left at the end of three days — no doubt very useful in 
any sudden emergency. 



In another letter to the same friend Washington .vrites: 
"We are now without any money in our treasury, powder 
in our magazines, or arms in our stores. We are without 
a brigadier — the want of which has been twenty times 
urged on Congress — engineers, or expresses, and by and 
by, when called to take the field, shall not have a tent to 
lie in. These are evils but small in comparison with those 
which disturb my present repose. Our enlistments are at 
a stand ; the fears I ever entertained are realized, viz. : The 
discontented officers have thrown such difficulties or stumb- 
ling blocks in the way of recruiting that I no longer 
entertain a hope of completing the army by voluntary 
enlistments,'' etc. "Thus am I situated with respect to 
men;" and he goes on to tell how in the matter of arms 
he is worse off. "How to get furnished I know not. I 
have applied to this and the neighboring colonies, but with 
what success time only can tell. The reflections on my 
situation produce many an unhappy hour, when all around 
me are wrapped in sleep. Fezv people knozv the predicament 
we are in; fewer still will believe, if any disaster happens 
to these lines, from what cause it flows. I have often 
thought how much happier I should have been if, instead 
of accepting the command under such circumstances, I 
had taken my musket on my shoulder and entered the 
ranks, or if I could have justified it to my conscience, had 
retired to the back country and lived in a wigwam. Could 
I have known that such a backwardness would have been 
discovered among the old soldiers" (meaning those at head- 
quarters when he took command), "all the generals upon 
earth should not have convinced me of the propriety of 
delaying an attack on Boston till this time." 



The Commander-in-Chief here refers to the fact that soon 
after his arrival at Cambridge he called a Council of War 
to consider the expediency of attacking- Boston, but the 
officers negatived it, as they did a second proposal of the 
same kind later. For himself, he would have risked much 
to give an impetus to public spirit; he deeply felt the 
criticisms on his own inactivity; we all know^ what a wise 
critic the public is of military aftairs, and that public was 
just as wise in such matters as our own. 

February i8th, 1776, the Commander-in-Chief writes to 
the President of Congress that the ice being now sufficiently 
strong to bear troops, he called a council of war, and pro- 
posed for the third time to assault Boston, but the general 
officers would not support him. 'True it is," he writes, 
"and I cannot help acknowledging it, that I have many 
disagreeable sensations on account of my situation, for to 
have the eyes of the whole continent fixed with anxious 
expectation of hearing of some great event, and to be 
restrained in every military operation for want of the 
necessary means to carry it on, is not very pleasing, 
especially as the means used to conceal my weakness from 
the enemy conceal it also from my friends, and add to their 
wonder." 

Finally — the patriots having thrown - up works that 
commanded the city — Howe, obliged to choose between 
fighting or evacuating, chose the latter, and In March 
sailed with his troops, as it was supposed, for New York, 
followed as soon as possible by his adversary. This, as you 
all know, was a very important point, strategically, and 
also on account of the strong Tory element in the province. 

In a letter to Congress from Headquarters near New 



York, September 24, 1776, the General thus expresses him- 
self: "We are now on the eve of another" — what? You 
would naturally expect him to say battle or engagement, 
oh! no! — "another dissolution of our army! The remem- 
brance of the difficulties which happened on the occasion 
last year, and the consequences which might have followed 
the change, if proper advantages had been taken by the 
enemy, added to a knowledge of the present temper and 
disposition of the troops, afiford but a very- gloomy prospect 
in the appearances of things now, and satisfy me, beyond 
the possibility of doubt, that unless some very speedy and 
effectual measures are adopted in Congress, our cause will 
be lost." 

He goes on to tell of his many various and distracting 
trials. "The present appearance of things is so little 
pleasing to myself as to render it a matter of no surprise 
to me if I should stand capitally censured by Congress, 
added to a consciousness of my inability to govern an army 
composed of such discordant parts and under a variety of 
intricate and perplexing circumstances, induce a behef not 
only, but a thorough conviction, in my mind that it will 
be impossible for me to conduct matters in such a manner 
as to give satisfaction to the public, which is all the 
recompense I aim at or wish for." 

In a further communication of October 4, 1776, dealing 
with many needs of the Army, he says: "The interval of 
time between the old and new^ armies must be filled up with 
militia from the separate States, "if to be had," with whom 
he knew his authority was entirely valueless; and he 
further tells Congress that "unless the most vigorous and 
decisive exertions are immediately adopted, the certain and 

14 



absolute loss of our liberties will be the inevitable conse- 
quence.'' 

November 6, the General writes to the Assembly of 
Massachusetts of the very critical state of things at Head- 
quarters; of the dissolution of one army and very little 
prospect of getting a new one in any reasonable time, and 
this in face of a powerful enemy; so he begs for State 
militia from Massachusetts to serve at least till March ist, 
unless their services could be earlier dispensed w^th. 

The temper of the New York militia at this time may bt 
judged of by the following extract from a letter of Gen. 
Greene's to Washington: "I am informed by Col. Hawkes 
Hay that the militia whom he commands refuse to do duty. 
They say Gen. Howe has promised them peace, liberty anct 
safety; and that is all they want. What is to be done?" 

To his brother, under date of November 19, 1776, the 
poor General writes how he had constantly and urgently 
put before Congress the absolute necessity of long enlist- 
ments and the extra expense of short enlistments; the 
backwardness of the States in filling the quotas called for 
by Congress; the different States quarreling among them- 
selves about the appointments of their officers, and nomi- 
nating such as arc not fit to he shoeblacks, from favoritism 
of this or that member of Assembly." 

At the end of November, Congress is again informed of 
the truly alarming state of things: "The last levies just 
going home, some who were engaged till January ist, now- 
leaving — a month before their time — and this with the 
enemy near." 

December 20, 1776, Washington writes to the President 
of Congress in the same strain. He is impatient to know 

15 



whether Cong^ress will allow the corps of artillery to be 
augmented and establish a corps of engineers. "No man 
ever had a greater choice of difficulties than he," and these 
have all come from short enlistments and a mistaken 
dependence on State militia. ''Militia will do for a little 
while, but in a little while, if often called upon, tniey will 
not come at all. The militia might have saved New Jersey, 
but they did not, and consequently the civilians there were 
fraternizing with the British. Can anything, he says, "be 
more destructive to the general recruiting service than 
giving $io bounty for six weeks' sendee of the militia, who 
come in, you cannot tell how; go, you cannot tell where; 
consume your provisions, exhaust your stores, and leave 
you at a critical moment. These, sir, are the men I am to 
depend upon ten days hence: this is the basis on which 
your cause will and must forever depend till you get a large 
standing army.-' 

This "standing army'' was bitterly opposed in Congress, 
but finally, experience having shewn its necessity, consent 
was reluctantly given for 88 battalions to be recruited. 

Washington tells Congress they must have lOO; his 
officers say no. In return they might say it would be 
difficult enough to get the first number; but in his opinion 
the officers of i lo Vv^ould be able to recruit many more men 
than the 88, Then he proceeds to tell them what this army 
must have: clothes, tents, ammunition, things that in this 
day are implied in the very name of army and absolutely 
essential to its efficiency. 

The winter of 1777 and 1778 was a very depressing one. 
The Commander-in-Chief had begun it with a force dimin- 
ished to 4,000 half-disciplined men, and an empty army- 

16 



chest. He had had to contend not merely with an enemy, 
but with the parsimony and meddlesome interference of 
Congress. Instead of that body using all its influence to 
urge the separate States, and especially those least affected 
by the war, to send men and means, it had left the army 
without funds and without reinforcements. It had made 
promotions contrary to his advice, and contrar}^ to military 
usage — thereby wronging and disgusting some of his 
bravest officers and changed the commissariat in the midst 
of a campaign, throwing the whole service into confusion. 
He applied to the Governors of Virginia and Pennsylvania 
for assistance until the new army authorized by Congress, 
and as yet only on paper, could be gathered and drilled. 
He depicted his condition in the most forcible manner, and 
urged them to send him reinforcements even if compelled 
to resort to a draft. ''A long and continual sacrifice of 
the individual for the public good,-' he wrote, "ought not 
to be expected or required. The nature of men must be 
changed before institutions built on the presumptive proot 
of such a principle can succeed. This condition is sup- 
ported by the conduct of the American Army as well as by 
that of all other men. At the commencement of the dis- 
pute, in the first effusion of zeal, when it was believed that 
service would be temporary, they entered into it without 
regard to pecuniaiy considerations, but finding its duration 
much longer than they had expected, and that instead of 
deriving advantage from the hardships and dangers to 
which they had been exposed, they were losers by their 
patriotism, and fell far short of even a competency for their 
wants, they have gradually abated in their ardor, and, with 
many, an entire disinclination to the service under present 



17 



circumstances has taken place. To this must be ascribed 
the frequent resignations and frequent importunities for 
permission to resign from officers of the highest merit.'* 
He goes on to say, ''You can only have a hold on a man 
when he values his commission and fears to lose it.'' The 
evils caused by the short enlistments and the jealousies 
of the separate States are thus commented on in a letter 
to Washington at this time from Robert Morris, a letter full 
of despondency at the condition of affairs. "It is iseless 
at this period to examine into the causes of our present 
unhappy situation unless that examination would be pro- 
ductive of a cure for those evils ; in fact, those causes have 
long been known to such as would open their eyes. It has 
been my fate to make an ineffectual opposition (in Con- 
gress) to all short enlistments, to colonial appointment of 
officers, and many other measures which I thought pregnant 
with mischief, but these things either suited the genius 
and habits or squared with the interests of some States that 
had sufficient interest to prevail, and nothing is now left 
but to extricate ourselves as well as we can." 

As time passed Washington must have viewed with the 
greatest anxiety not only the military, but the political 
situation. In a letter to his brother, in the spring of 1778, 
he regrets that the ablest men are kept at home in the ser- 
vice of the Independent States, while inferior men are sent 
to the General Congress; and yet on these depend the great 
national interests. "Those wiio are at a distance from the 
seat of war are living in such perfect tranquility that they 
conceive the war to be in a manner at an end, while those 
near it are so disaffected tliat they only serve as embarrass- 
ments." 



18 



It seemed to devolve on Washington to arouse the 
patriotism as well as to lead the armies of his country. In 
the winter of 1777-78, through Col. Harrison of Virginia, 
he made a most earnest appeal to the men of his native 
State. "Our affairs are in a more distressed, ruinous and 
deplorable condition than they have been since the com- 
mencement of the war. By a faithful laborer then in the 
cause; by a man who is daily injuring his private estate 
without the smallest earthly advantage, not common to all 
in case of a favorable issue of the dispute; by one who 
wishes the prosperity of America most devoutly, but sees 
it, or thinks he sees it, on the brink of ruin; you are 
besought most earnestly, my dear Colonel Harrison, to 
exert yourself in endeavoring to rescue your country, by 
sending your best and ablest men to Congress. If I were 
to be called upon to draw a picture of the times and of men, 
from what I have seen, heard and in part know, I should 
in one word say that idleness, dissipation, and extravagance 
seem to have laid fast hold of most of them; that specula- 
tion, peculation, and an insatiable thirst for riches, seem 
to have got the better of every other consideration, and 
almost of every order of men; that party disputes and 
personal quarrels are the great business of the day; while 
the momentous concerns of an empire, a great and accumu- 
lating debt, ruined finances, depreciated money and want 
of credit, which in its consequences is the want of every- 
thing, are but secondary considerations, and postponed from 
day to day, from wxek to week, as if our affairs wore the 
most promising aspect." 

As a remedy for this culpable indifference, he suggests 
that each colony should not only choose, but absolutely 

19 



compel their ablest men to attend Congress, and should 
instruct them to go into a thorough investigation of the 
causes that have produced such effects for the purpose of 
remedying them. "Of what use is it," he enquires, ''for the 
States to be wholly engrossed in their individual affairs, 
framing constitutions and making laws? If the great whole 
is mismanaged, they will sink with the general wreck — being 
lost by their own folly and negligence, or by the desire of 
living at ease and tranquility during so great a revolution, 
which demanded the ablest efforts of their ablest and most 
honest men." 

At this very time, and while the army was suffering the 
extremes of cold and hunger, in Philadelphia, not very 
distant from it, "An assembly, a concert, a dinner, a supper, 
that will cost 300 or 400 pounds, will not only take men 
off from acting in this business, but even from thinking 
of it; while a great part of the ofificers of our army, from 
absolute necessity, are quitting the service, and the more 
virtuous few, rather than do this, are sinking by sure de- 
grees into beggary and want.'' 

To add to other trials, in this year appeared the forged 
letters which were circulated freely through the country, and 
represented the General as secretly attached to the British 
cause. He took no public notice of them whatever, but to 
his friends denounced their villainy, it being evident they 
were written by some one who had been familiar in his 
household. He probably never would have noticed them 
publicly if in his last presidential term, in the midst of the 
bitterest calumny, these letters had not re-appeared on the 
stage of public affairs. Till this time his enemies had been 
able to say, "Of course he wrote them; he has never denied 



it.'' And for this reason we may judg-e he made such a 
very formal and public denial just as he left public life 
forever. 

Another difficulty which Washington had to meet, and 
which required infinite tact, address and secrecy to adjust, 
was, in addition to the conflicting claims of the officers from 
the various independent States, those of foreigners, who, as 
our war continued, offered their experience and their 
services to the cause of freedom. From Poland, from 
France, from Germany, came enthusiastic men, holding 
high commissions at home, and not willing to be put under 
inferior officers here. This was a difficult matter to arrange ; 
their services must not be refused, and yet to place in com- 
mand of our troops men ignorant of their peculiar char- 
acter, habits and customs, and especially of their language, 
seemed unwise. He did, however, overcome these difficul- 
ties successfully. Kosciusko, De Kalb, Steuben, Pulaski, 
and many others of lesser fame, became valuable aids in our 
cause, and as for Lafayette, 3^ou know how his name is 
inseparably linked with that of Washington. 

The Continental Congress had limited themselves to the 
expenditure of twenty millions. When this and much more 
had been used ; when, in fact, it had become bankrupt, and 
its paper worthless, Washington's difficulties were greatly 
increased. 

Many officers had entered the army with a little means, 
which soon melted away, leaving them destitute and in 
rags. At one time a year's pay would hardly buy a pair 
of shoes; many commissions were thrown up, and the 
General's heart bled at losing some of his very best officers. 

But I can only glance, in the time allotted me, at a few 
of the secret troubles of our great General. Perhaps the 



■one that affected him most is known in history as "Con- 
way's Cabal/' 

A Frenchman of Irish descent named Conway, a veteran 
of European wars, received a commission from Congress 
as Brigadier. Boastful, ambitions, intriguing and bent only 
on pushing his personal fortunes, he contrived to influence 
not only Generals Gates, Mifflin and others of less rank, 
b)ut also members of Congress, including its committee 
called the Board of War. This intrigue was in opposition 
to Washington, whom it was hoped to force to a resigna- 
tion and have Gates appointed in his place. The Com- 
mander-in-Chief had seen enough of Conway to understand 
his character and his aims, and hearing he was to be pro- 
moted, wrote a strong letter of remonstrance to a member 
of Congress, which, however, did not prevent Conway 
l3eing made Inspector General. This conspiracy was 
carried on by insidious and depreciating public conversation 
and by anonymous letters of the same character. The fol- 
lowing anonymous letter received by Patrick Henry, 
Governor of Virginia, was sent by him to General Wash- 
ington : 

"Yorktown, January 12, 1778. 

''Dear Sir — The common danger of our country first 
"brought you and me together. I recollect with pleasure 
the influence of your conversation and eloquence upon the 
opinions of this country, in the beginning of the present 
controversy. You first taught us to shake off our idolatrous 
•attachment to royalty, and to oppose its encroachments 
upon our liberties with our veiy lives. By these means you 
saved us from ruin. The independence of America is the 
offspring of that liberal spirit of thinking and acting which 



followed the destruction of the sceptres of kings and the 
mighty power of Great Britain. But, sir, w^e have only 
passed the Red Sea; a dreary wilderness is still before us, 
and unless a Moses or a Joshua are raised up in our behalf, 
we must perish before wc reach the promised land. We 
have nothing to fear from our enemies on the way. Gen. 
Howe, it is true, has taken Philadelphia, but he has only 
changed his prison. His dominions are bounded on all 
sides by his out-sentries. America can only be undone by 
herself. She looks up to her councils and arms for pro- 
tection; but, alas! what are they? Her repiesentation in 
Congress dwindled to only twenty-one members. Her 
Adams, her Wilson, her Henry are no more among them. 
Her councils weak — and partial remedies applied constantly 
for universal diseases. Her army, what is it? A Major- 
General belonging to it called it a few days ago, in my 
hearing, a mob. Discipline — wholly neglected; the Com- 
missary's and Quarter-Master's departments, filled with 
idleness, ignorance and peculation; our hospitals crowded 
with 6,000 sick, but half provided with necessaries or accom- 
modations, and more dying in them in one month than 
perished in the field during the whole of the last season. 
The money depreciating without effectual means being 
taken to raise it; the country distracted with Quixotic 
attempts to regulate the price of provisions; an artificial 
famine created by it and a real one dreaded from it. The 
spirit of our people failing through a more intimate 
acquaintance with the causes of our misfortunes: many 
submitting daily to Gen. Howe, and more wishing to do it 
only to avoid the calamities that threaten our country. . But 
is our cause desperate? By no means. We have wisdom, 



23 



virtue and strength enough to save us if they could be 
called into action. The northern army has shown what 
Americans are capable of doing with a General at their head. 
A Gates, a Lee, or a Conway would in a few weeks render 
them an irresistible body of men. The last of the above 
officers has accepted of the new office of Inspector-General 
of our Army, in order to reform abuses — but the remedy 
is only a palliative one. In one of his letters to a friend 
he says, 'A great and good God hath decreed America to 
be free — or a weak General and bad counselors would have 
ruined her long ago.' You may rest assured of each of 
the facts related in this letter. The author of it is one of 
your Philadelphia friends. A hint of his name if found out 
by the handwriting must not be mentioned to your intimate 
friend. Even tlie letter must be thrown into the fire, but 
some of its contents ought to be made public in order to 
awaken, enlighten and alarm our country. I rely upon 
your prudence and am, dear sir, with my usual attachment 
to you and to our beloved independence, 

"Yours sincerely, .'' 

There is no doubt anonymous letters ought usually to 
be thrown into the fire, but this one went straight to 
Washington with a most reverential epistle from Patrick 
Plenry, to whom it had been addressed. After saying that 
the anonymous correspondent may be too insignificant to 
be noticed, and yet fearing there may be some scheme or 
party forming against the General, he continues: 'To give 
you the trouble of this gives me pain. It would suit my 
inclination better to give you some assistance in the great 
business of the v/ar. But I will not conceal anything from 

24 



you by which you may be affected, for I really think your 
personal welfare and the happiness of America are inti- 
mately connected." 

Another anonymous letter was received by the patriotic 
President of Congress, Henry Laurens, with a request to 
lay it before that body. This letter is too long to quote 
here. After dwelling minutely upon all the losses and dis- 
asters of the campaign, and showing how in the opinion 
of the writer they ought not to have occurred, it ended thus : 
''The people of America have been guilty of idolatry in 
making a man their God, and the God of Heaven and 
earth will convince them by woeful experience that he is 
only a man ; that no good may be expected from the stand- 
ing army until Baal and his worshipers are banished from 
the camp." This epistle also, instead of being laid before 
Congress as requested by the writer, was sent at once to 
Washington. 

At this time also came a warning from the General's old 
and faithful friend. Dr. Craik, informing him that secret 
enemies were trying to ruin him in the estimation of the 
country, claiming that he had had abundant force to crush 
the enemy; that he had really given up Philadelphia; that 
he could have defeated the enemy many times, and holding 
up Gates' success in contrast. Dr. Craik further told him 
that his enemies dared not appear openly, but were power- 
ful in Congress, even in the Board of War itself, and hoped 
to force him to resign, 

Washington's conduct in this emergency is really a model 
to humanity and shows to what heights a noble motive and 
a clear conscience can elevate human nature. In his reply 
to Laurens, President of Congress, who had sent him one 

25 



of the anonymous letters, he writes: "1 was not unapprized 
that a malignant faction had been for some time forming 
to my prejudice, which could not but give me pain on a 
personal account, but my chief concern arises from the 
apprehension of the dangerous consequences which 
intestine dissensions may produce to the common cause. I 
would not desire in the least degree to suppress a free spirit 
of inquiry into any part of my conduct that even faction 
itself may deem reprehensible. The anonymous paper 
handed to you exhibits many serious charges, and it is my 
wish that it should be submitted to Congress. My enemies 
take an unfair advantage of me. They know the delicacy 
of my situation, and that motives of policy deprive me of 
the defense I might otherwise make against their insidious 
attacks. They know I cannot combat their insinuations, 
however injurious, without disclosing secrets which it is of 
the utmost moment to coiiceal.^^ 

What these were the Commander-in-Chief does not relate. 
They may have been already known to Laurens — it may 
have been again deficiency of powder, or men, or arms, or 
clothes, or food, or all these together — it was something 
that could not be made public without encouraging the 
enemy. 

The movers in this conspiracy were startled to find the 
General knew of its existence, but he took no public notice, 
not even Vv^hen Conway was confirmed as Inspector-General; 
he left the matter to work itself out. Washington Irving 
says that the Cabal might have accomplished the downfall 
of the Commander-in-Chief if he had been more irascible 
in his temper, more impulsive, and less firmly fixed in the 
affections of the people. The after history of the chief 

26 



conspirator is an interesting comment on this affair. While 
he held the office of Inspector-General, his reports to Con- 
gress were often disrespectful and fault-finding, and finally 
that body not carrying out one of his suggestions, in a fit 
of temper he sent in his resignation, which to his surprise 
was immediately accepted. Being in the habit of making 
offensive speeches about the army, he was challenged by 
General Cadwallader for one made in his presence. They 
fought and Conway fell, it was supposed, mortally wounded. 
In this condition he sent the following note to Washington: 

"Philadelphia, July 2.:}^, 1778. 
"Sir — I find myself just able to hold my pen during a few 
moments, and I take this opportunity to express my sincere 
grief for having written, said, or done anything disagree- 
able to your Excellency. jNIy career will soon be over; 
therefore justice and truth prompt me to declare my last 
sentiments. You are in my eyes the great and good man. 
May you long enjoy the love, veneration and esteem of 
these States, whose liberties you have asserted by your 
virtues. I am with the greatest respect, Thomas Conway." 

This clique hostile to Washington contented themselves 
afterwards in secretly encouraging disaffection, contraven- 
ing his wishes and obstructing his plans, hoping his popu- 
larity would thus be gradually undermined till they could 
adopt bolder measures. It was perhaps to this affair that 
the following story, related by Washington Irving as told 
him by Judge Jay, referred: 

"Shortly before the death of John Adams, I was sitting 
alone with my father" (the John Jay of the treaty), "con- 
versing about the American Revolution. Suddenly he 

27 



remarked, 'Oh! William! the history of that revolution will 
never be known; nobody now alive knows it but John 
Adams and myself.' Surprised at such a declaration, I 
asked him to what he referred. He briefly replied, 'The 
proceedings of the old Congress.' Again I inquired, 'What 
proceedings?' To this he answered, 'Those against Wash- 
ington; from first to last there was a most bitter party 
against him.' As the old Congress sat with closed doors 
the public knew no more than it chose to reveal." 

Let us be thankful for our ignorance here, and that we do 
not know the men who opposed and hated the man who 
gained our liberties for us; they are forgotten; while his 
memory, as Conway wished, is loved and venerated not 
only in this country, but by the whole civilized world. 

Washington's character was so lofty in ideal, and in fact, 
that no malice, no scandal, could really affect him; it was 
this thorough honesty of heart and purpose, this absolute 
consecration to duty, however hard, that so greatly 
impressed all who came in personal contact with him; this 
unreserved devotion of himself stood in the place of that 
enthusiasm that attracts and controls men — often for evil 
as well as good. To the soldiers of the Continental Army, 
his influence, example and sympathy became all powerful, 
and transformed them into a band of heroes, bearing 
hunger, nakedness and suffering of every kind without a 
murmur, cheerfully offering their lives on their country's 
altar. Their sufferings might have been averted or greatly 
lessened if the thirteen independent States had quickly 
and patriotically met the requisitions of Congress; or even, 
as we look back, if the great cities had come forward to the 
extent of their ability. There was money enough and food 

28 



enough in the country for the needs of the army, but the 
extreme jealousy of each other, of the separate States, and 
fear of a standing army — producing want of co-operation, 
added to the difficulties of transportation, often made the 
burden fall very unequally. To these conditions Wash- 
ington alludes in a farewell circular addressed to the 
(jovernors of the thirteen colonies, when he took leave of 
the army at the end of the war: 

"The war might have been earlier brought to the same 
happy conclusion if the resources of the country could have 
been properly drawn forth; the discouragements occasioned 
by the complicated diiftculties and embarrassments in which 
our affairs were by this means involved, would have long 
ago produced the dissolution of an army less patient, less 
virtuous, and less persevering than that T have had the 
honor to command.'' 



Conway recovered from his wounds, but finding his position in 
this country intolerable, returned to France. 



29 



LRBS'lb 



